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4Note: Protecting Intangible Expectations Under
Collective Bargaining Agreements-Overcoming
the Proscription of Arbitral Penalties
The goal of promoting industrial stability provides the
touchstone for judicial and legislative determinations of national
labor policy. The desire to avoid industrial strife, which under-
lies most national labor legislation,1 stems from the far-reaching
effects which labor disruptions have on the complex American
economy.
2
"The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabiliza-
tion through the collective bargaining agreement."3 Labor and
management negotiate the terms of employment with a view to
avoiding discord for the duration of the contract. Since these
terms are often vague and incomplete, the contractual interpreta-
tions of labor and management frequently conflict, threatening
to frustrate this objective. National labor policy demands effec-
tive resolution of these disputes through protection of legitimate
contractual expectations.4
Courts and arbitrators, however, are undermining this policy
by failing to redress injury to certain contractual expectations.
1. H. WELLNGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PaocEss 45 (1968).
2. Then Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg commented on this
matter in a speech reported in the New York Times, Feb. 24, 1962, at
1, col 2:
[Goldberg] said the issues in labor-management affairs had be-
come "far too complex, far too potent, and far too influential
on the rest of society to be resolved on the old testing ground
of clash of selfish interest." . . . [T]he Secretary said: "I have
the conviction that the plain fact is that our destiny as a free
nation depends as never before in history on achievement of a
greater sense of national unity. For the country that is the
world's foremost industrial power, the building of a stronger and
more durable industrial peace is clearly a precondition of na-
tional unity."
3. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960).
4. One portion of the legislative history of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, emphasized by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957), states that:
The execution of an agreement does not by itself promote
industrial peace. The chief advantage which an employer can
reasonably expect from a collective labor agreement is assurance
of uninterrupted operation during the term of the agreement.
Without some effective method of assuring freedom from eco-
nomic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little rea-
son why an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
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Collective bargaining agreements affect numerous interests
which, though intangible, are nevertheless significant. Such in-
terests include the job security of employees, the reputation of the
union which represents the employees, the relative bargaining
power of the parties during the term of the agreement and in
future negotiations, and such benefits as vacation scheduling.
Since the collective bargaining agreement influences these inter-
ests, it induces expectations in the parties as to how the interests
will fare in the future. Although courts and arbitrators some-
times recognize the significance of these contractual expectations,
they commonly refuse to award c6mpensation for injury to intan-
ible interests because the injury defies precise quantification.
Courts and arbitrators conclude that any monetary award with-
out a particularized accounting of damage constitutes a "pen-
alty," thought to be proscribed by public policy. This restrictive
policy places too much emphasis on traditional contract theory.
In order to effectively defuse industrial tension, the arbitral
process must accommodate and remedy injuries to intangible
interests. Since the present view of arbitral remedial power
stifles the protection of these interests, an alternative must be
found.
This Note will consider current court and arbitral disposition
of cases involving injury to intangible interests in light of
Supreme Court pronouncements on labor contract disputes. The
infirmities of the arbitral penalty proscription will be then
exposed and an alternative examined.
I.
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln. Mills5 the Supreme Court
recognized that national labor policy requires peaceful adminis-
tration of collective bargaining agreements.6 In a subsequent
group of decisions, commonly known as The Steelworkers
Trilogy,7 the Court acknowledged that private grievance arbi-
tration is the best means for attaining this goal.8 Several attri-
5. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
6. See note 4 supra.
7. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
8. "The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization
through the collective bargaining agreement.... A major factor in
achieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision for arbitration
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butes recommend this procedure, including the speed with which
arbitrators act,9 and their expertise in applying the contract
in light of the ongoing demands of the labor-management
relationship.'0 In order to maximize these benefits, the Court
held inapplicable the inhospitable law governing commercial
arbitration" and granted arbitrators broad discretion in resolv-
ing contract grievances.
of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement." United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
9. [T]he very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide
a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of industrial dis-
putes without resort to strikes, lockouts, or other self-help meas-
ures. This basic purpose is obviously largely undercut if there
is no immediate, effective remedy for those very tactics that ar-
bitration is designed to obviate.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
See Wolff, The Power of the Arbitrator to Make Monetary Awards, in
NATIONAL AcADEMY OF ARBrrRATORS, LABOR ARBITRATION-PERSPECTIVES
AND PROBLEMS 176, 192 (M. Kahn ed. 1964); cf. Nash, The NLRB and
Arbitration: Some Impressions of the Practical Effect of the Board's
Collyer Policy Upon Arbitrators and Arbitration, in NATIONAL AcADEMY
OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATiON-1974 at 106, 113-14 (B. Denis & B. Somers
ed. 1974).
10. The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the par-
ties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop
and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear con-
siderations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria
for judgment. ... . The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring
the same experience and competence to bear upon the determi-
nation of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960); WELLINGTON, supra note 1, at 105; Summers, Labor Arbitration;
A Private Process with a Public Function, 34 REv. Jun. U.P.R. 477, 480
(1965).
11. Thus the run of arbitration cases ... becomes irrelevant
to our problem .... In the commercial case, arbitration is
the substitute for litigation. Here arbitration is the substitute
for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor disputes has quite
different functions from arbitration under an ordinary commer-
cial contract, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration
of commercial agreements has no place here.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578
(1960). The common law policy which was held inapplicable in Warrior
Gulf is described in Williston's treatise:
At common law, a general agreement to arbitrate future dis-
putes in entirety, whether the agreement is contained in a con-
tract involving other matters or in a separate agreement, is void-
able at will by either party at any time before an award is
made ....
16 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1923, at 554 n.1
(W. Jaeger ed. 1976).
The reason for declaring agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes void and unenforceable is that they were said to be against
public policy or that they deprived the courts of their jurisdic-
tion.
Although the common law rule of refusing to enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes has been questioned even in
19761
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The Court further noted that this discretion could be of
particular utility in formulating remedies:
;When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply
the collective bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed
judgment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem.
This is especially true when it comes to formulating remedies.
There the need is for flexibility in meeting a wide variety of
situations. The draftsmen may never have thought of what
specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular con-
tingency. 12
Despite the emphasis placed on flexibility by the The Steel-
workers Trilogy, lower courts and arbitrators generally remain
inflexible in their approach to penalty awards. One arbitrator
states: "[O]ne thing that is clear in the developing body of
arbitration and labor relations law is that arbitrators almost
universally will refuse to award any damages which appear
to be punitive."'3 International Operating Engineers, Local 450
v. Mid-Valley, Inc.14 exemplifies the courts' aversion to arbitral
penalties. The employer, Mid-Valley, Inc., breached its collec-
tive bargaining agreement by failing to hire additional bargain-
ing unit workers. The court struck down the arbitrator's
damage award,' 5 holding that, since there was no "compensable
states that have not rejected the rule by statute, most courts are
unwilling to disturb it unless a statute makes such agreements
enforceable.
Id. at 555 (footnotes omitted).
12. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 597 (1960).
13. ACF Industries, Inc., 62 Lab. Arb. 364, 365 (1974). See Wolff,
supra note 9, at 189-90; Fleming, Arbitrators and the Remedy Power, 48
VA. L. REv. 1199, 1221 (1962); Sirefrnan, Rights Without Remedies in
Labor Arbitration, 18 AR3. J. 17, 32-35 (1963); Consolidation Coal Co., 65
Lab. Arb. 1167, 1175 (1975) (decisions which uphold arbitral award of
punitive damages under extraordinary circumstances are "clearly in the
minority").
The present arbitral "penalty" proscription encompasses two distinct
situations. First, it refers to a monetary award where there is no prov-
able monetary loss. In this situation, although the party has suffered
a significant injury, proof of calculable loss is so uncertain as to make
a monetary award "impossible."
Second, it refers to those awards constituting "punitive damages" in
the true sense: where the injury has been fully compensated and the
additional award is intended solely to punish and deter. See, e.g., Pub-
lishers' Ass'n of New York City v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union,
280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401, 18 Lab. Arb. 855 (1st Dep't 1952).
Because awards of this type are rare, this Note focuses on the former
variety of "penalties."
14. 347 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
15. Contracting parties do not normally agree to assess ex-
emplary damages for a breach of contract. Such damages being
punitive in nature are rare in contract law. Contractual consent
[Vol. 61:127
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injury," the award constituted an unauthorized "penalty" on the
employer.16 Though accepting the arbitral finding of breach,
the court found no acceptable theory to support the monetary
award.17
Scattered decisions, however, have adopted a "compensatory"
theory for monetary awards in analogous circumstances. In the
leading case, Local 369, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v.
to so drastic a "remedy" for simple breach cannot be implied.
Therefore, an arbitrator's assessment of punitive damages must
be grounded in express language. In this case, neither the con-
tract clause nor the simple question submitted suggest authority
for exemplary damages.
Id. at 1109.
16. While the collective bargaining agreement at issue in Mid-Val-
ley did not expressly authorize "penalty" awards, the court indicated that
such a clause might have altered its decision. See note 15 supra. Such
clauses are occasionally found. See, e.g., In the Round Dinner Playhouse,
Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 118, 130-32 (1970). In Publishers' Ass'n of New York
City v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 280 App. Div. 500, 114
N.Y.S.2d 401, 18 Lab. Arb. 855 (1st Dep't 1952), however, the court
struck down such an award in the face of express contract authorization,
holding it contrary to public policy.
The Publishers' Ass'n decision has been the subject of extensive
scholarly attack. Fleming, supra note 13, at 1209-10. See 52 CoLum. L.
Rzv. 943 (1952); 66 I-Anv. L. REv. 525 (1953); Comment, Judicial Review
of Arbitration: The Role of Public Policy, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 545, 554-55
(1963). Arbitrators have frequently expressed the belief that they
are not bound by the decision. See Wolff, supra note 9, at 188; In the
Round Dinner Playhouse, Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 118, 131 (1970); Seaboard
World Airlines, 53 Lab. Arb. 1056, 1060 (1969); Mallinckrodt Chem.
Works, 50 Lab. Arb. 933, 939 n.8 (1968). Publishers' Ass'n was re-
cently attacked in In re Arbitration Between Ass'd Gen. Contractors and
Savin Bros., Inc., 45 App. Div. 2d 136, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374 (3d Dep't 1974),
aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975), which up-
held a contractually authorized arbitral penalty for breach of a multi-
employer bargaining association agreement. It seems likely that any
penalty now awarded pursuant to express contractual authorization will
be upheld. It is the award of arbitral penalties in the more prevalent
situation of collective bargaining agreement silence with which this Note
is primarily concerned.
17. The Mid-Valley court's holding on this issue is at odds with
other aspects of its decision. The court divided the arbitral award into
two portions-damages accruing from the date of the breach to the date
of arbitration and damages accruing from the date of arbitration to the
date of compliance-and struck down only the former. In distinguishing
the invalid from the valid portion of the award, the court stated: "Un-
like payments for future breach, this portion of the award does not en-
courage prospective compliance thereby enforcing the contract, it only
punishes for past breach." 347 F. Supp. at 1110. This distinction seems
to be between unproductive and productive deterrence-oriented dam-
ages rather than between those compensatory and those punitive in na-
ture. Indeed, deterrence is the hallmark of punitive awards, which the
court earlier found the arbitrator without contractual power to make.
19761
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Cotton Baking Co.,' 8 the Fifth Circuit upheld an arbitrator's
award of damages based on an employer's use of non-bargaining
unit employees to do bargaining unit work. While the employees
failed to establish a loss of wages as a result of the breach, the
court noted the existence of less quantifiable injuries:
[T]he arbitrator concluded that the company's work assignment
policies denied the union members work opportunities to which
they were entitled under the contract. Not only were fewer
union members drawing salaries from the company because of
this arrangement, but the job security of all union members was
indirectly effected [sic] because there were fewer jobs to
"bump down" to in the event of layoffs.19
This finding that the employees had been "damaged" allowed the
court to distinguish Mid-Valley,20 which premised its "penalty"
characterization of the arbitral award on the absence of damage.
The court approved without comment the arbitrator's method
of damage measurement: one year's wages at the rate paid to
the outside workers for the job performed.21
Moreover, the court's contention that the initial portion of the award
did not encourage compliance is questionable. Had the first portion of
the award been upheld, the damages accumulating due to the employer's
delay in implementing the arbitral decision would supplement an al-
ready substantial award. Assuming there is a threshold amount which
compels an employer's compliance, that point would be reached more
quickly. Further, knowledge that damages will be awarded for breach-
ing activity prior to arbitration would arguably deter future employer
breach. Unless damages are awarded for a breach occurring prior to
the date of arbitration, the employer would be more likely to knowingly
breach the contract again, safe in the knowledge that he would enjoy
a period of damage immunity. The court's criterion for implying reme-
dial power thus becomes the degree to which compliance is encouraged
rather than the presence or absence of such encouragement. If deter-
rence-oriented damages are held, as would seem the case here, to derive
from the "essence of the collective bargaining agreement," then the
court's line-drawing according to degree of effectiveness contravenes the
Supreme Court's mandate to give the arbitrator's remedial power wide
berth. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
18. 514 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976).
19. 514 F.2d at 1238.
20. The court reversed a lower court decision which had relied on
Mid-Valley. Local 369, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Cotton Bak-
ing Co., 377 F. Supp. 1172 (W.D. La. 1974), rev'd, 514 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976). The circuit court's language
in making the distinction evinced an uneasiness with the Mid-Valley ra-
tionale: "While we render no judgment as to the validity of the Mid-
Valley decision, we find its rationale inapplicable to this case, and even
if applicable, it is not binding on this court." 514 F.2d at 1238.
21. The court did state, however, that the parties to the arbitration
had anticipated that any award would be based on the applicable wage
rate. 514 F.2d at 1238 n.4.
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One arbitral decision, Mallinckrodt Chemical Works,22 sug-
gests that either compensation or deterrence may justify, under
facts similar to those in Cotton Baking,23 a monetary award.
Although not relying on a specific theory, the arbitrator recog-
nized that compensation might be appropriate for either injury
to union reputation or loss of overtime opportunities caused by
the breach.24 Additionally, the knowing nature of the breach,
according to the arbitrator, might justify damages designed to
deter further misconduct.2
II.
In contrast to Mid-Valley, Cotton Baking and Maflinckrodt
correctly acknowledge the need to protect the contractual
expectations concerning intangible interests aroused in the par-
ties to a collective bargaining agreement.26 The labor contract
embodies substantial expectations of this type in all three of the
major parties: union, employees, and employer. Al the parties,
for example, are interested in maintaining their bargaining posi-
tions for subsequent negotiations.2 7 This bargaining strength
will rest on such factors as the proportion of the employer's total
work force included in the relevant bargaining unit2 s and the
importance of the tasks performed by bargaining unit workers-
factors clearly affected by interpretation of the collective bar-
22. 50 Lab. Arb. 933 (1968).
23. In Mallinckrodt, the employer assigned bargaining unit work to'
non-bargaining unit workers. All bargaining unit workers were em-
ployed full time; no one was laid off. 50 Lab. Axb. at 937.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 936.
26. Another decision upholding arbitral power to compensate in-
tangible injury, Asbestos Workers, Local 66 v. Leona Lee Corp., 84
L.R.R.M. 2165 (W.D. Tex. 1973), awarded damages for impairment of the
Union's reputation, as well as for loss of bargaining power. In Secondary
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 92 L.R.R.M. 2059 (App. Div. 1976), the school
board violated a contract in its assigmnent of duties to teachers. The
court upheld the arbitrator's award, which was based in part on a desire
to deter future school board violations, classifying the award as com-
pensation for the harm-presumably inconvenience-caused by breach.
27. See, e.g., Asbestos Workers, Local 66 v. Leona Lee Corp., 84
L.R.R.M. 2165, 2171 (W.D. Tex. 1973) (emphasizing the importance of
bargaining power to the union).
28. The NLRB has recognized that the size of a bargaining unit di-
rectly affects its strength and consequently "the interests of all employ-
ees in continuing to bargain together in order to maintain their collective
strength." Mallinckrodt Chem. Works and IBEW, Local 1, 162 N.L.R.B.
387, 392 (1966). Bargaining strength thus constitutes a major factor in
the NLRB's determination of bargaining units for purposes of representa-
tion elections.
1976]
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gaining agreement. Employees are also interested in such intan-
gible factors as job security,29 working conditions, and vacation
schedules. Finally, the union has a survival interest in sustain-
ing its reputation among the employees it represents.30 The
union's ability to compel employer compliance with the collective
bargaining agreement provides a chief source of its popular-
ity.31 Because collective bargaining agreements greatly affect
intangible interests, the signing of such contracts produces expec-
tations as to the future status of these interests. Significant
frustration of these expectations would generate industrial ten-
sion antithetical to national policy. Yet, absent arbitral awards,
there is little reason for a party not to breach a collective bar-
gaining agreement.3 2  Strong pragmatic considerations thus
demand that available arbitral remedies include the power to
award "penalties. 38
29. See Local 369, Bakery & Confectionery Workers v. Cotton Bak-
ing Co., 514 F.2d 1235, 1236, 1238 (1975).
30. See Asbestos Workers, Local 66 v. Leona Lee Corp., 84 L.R.R.M.
2165, 2171 (W.D. Tex. 1973); Sonic Knitting Industries, Inc., 65 Lab. Arb.
453, 470 (1975); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 50 Lab. Arb. 933, 937 (1968);
Five Star Hardware & Elec. Corp., 44 Lab. Arb. 944, 946 (1965).
31. [T]he thrust of this argument is that the vice of an unreme-
died misassignment of work, at very least a knowing misassign-
ment, is that it reflects adversely on the Union and injures the
Union's standing among the employees. "What good is the
Union if the Company can ignore the Union contract whenever
it wishes and the Union can't do anything about it?", a typical
employee might ask. Arguably, the Union is entitled to protec-
tion against this type of injury to its reputation....
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 50 Lab. Arb. 933, 937 (1968).
32. But cf., Sirefman, supra note 13, at 33:
Naturally, unions contend that awards without sanctions
and penalties have little value as deterrents. Some arbitrators
do not agree. Arbitrator Sam Tatum Davis has said: "There
are many situations in the law and the affairs of men where
there can be injury without monetary recompense or penalty.
In the affairs of men there are times when one must have faith
that men of honor will respect their obligations."
33. It is admittedly impossible to quantify the injury caused by the
failure to award "penalties." The same could be said, however, with
regard to any weakness in the arbitral system for enforcing collective
bargaining agreements. For example, a party's refusal to abide by an
arbitral award forces the other party to seek court enforcement. This
strips arbitration of one of its prime advantages: the expeditious settle-
ment of disputes. See note 9 supra. If unchecked, this practice could
undermine the parties' willingness to rely on arbitration; since arbitra-
tion is "the substitute for industrial strife," United Steelworkers v. War-
rior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960), this practice contra-
venes the national policy of promoting industrial peace recognized in
Warrior & Gulf, see note 8 supra. Although it is impossible to quantify
this danger, courts have nevertheless responded by awarding an amount
to recompense the attorneys' fees of the party seeking enforcement of
[Vol. 61:127
ARBITRAL PENALTIES
In light of the severe consequences, the argument supporting
the refusal to protect intangible interests lacks persuasiveness.
It is based upon the familiar requirement of compensatory
damage theory that the claimant must establish, with "reason-
able certainty," the monetary value of.the injury caused by the
breach.34  The arbitrator's decision in a case such as Grain
Processing Corp.,35 illustrates the use of this theory. Despite
uncontradicted testimony that the employer had repeatedly
violated a provision of the collective bargaining agreement
requiring consultation with a union steward and the union presi-
dent prior to entering into "outside" contracts, the arbitrator
awarded no damages. The breach denied the union the opportun-
ity to persuade the employer to assign the work to employees
within the bargaining unit. Moreover, by ignoring the collective
bargaining agreement the employer probably undermined the
union's prestige. These injuries, however, were "intangible."
Proof of job loss specifically attributable to the employer's fail-
ure to consult was impossible, since the clause did not preclude
the employer from entering into "outside contracts" subsequent
to the required consultation. In light of the contract's failure
to authorize assessment of a penalty, the arbitrator found it
"impossible to pinpoint [a] remedy."3 6 Instead, he was reduced
to presumably unenforceable pronouncements: "the Company is
now on notice that any further breaches will be subject to
challenge on behalf of the Union. '3 7  Other cases follow the
the awards where the other party's refusal to comply is unjustified. See
United Steelworkers v. Butler Mfg. Co., 439 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1971);
Dist. 50, UIW v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 421 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1970);
Local No. 149, UAW v. American Brake Shoe Co., 298 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.
1962). This response, according to the American Brake Shoe court, is
mandated by the policies underlying national labor legislation. 298 F.2d
at 216.
These cases suggest that a party need only demonstrate that his at-
tempted use of the arbitration machinery has been frustrated to evoke
a remedial reaction. Because Congress, according to Warrior & Gulf, has
made the judgment that arbitration is necessary to industrial peace, evi-
dence that effective arbitration is being frustrated indicates, prima facie,
a threat of industrial warfare. The widespread nature of the frustration
caused by the "penalty" proscription is indicated by the numerous in-
stances in which parties have sought, but been denied, a remedy for an
established breach of contract. See, e.g., decisions cited at note 38 infra.
Relief should not be denied because a party is unable to demonstrate
empirically how much industrial tension-in terms of slackened produc-
tivity or increased strike activity-is specifically attributable to a partic-
ular practice.
34. REsTATEmENT OF CONTRACTS § 331(1) (1932).
35. 65 Lab. Arb. 431 (1975).
36. Id. at 434.
37. Id. at 435.
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same rationale: the absence of injury cognizable under tradi-
tional contract compensation theory leads to the conclusion that
any monetary award must constitute a '"penalty,"s held to be
beyond the arbitrator's remedial power.39
Arbitral power arises from the collective bargaining agree-
ment.40 While the agreement is normally silent as to the scope
of remedial power 41-providing merely that the arbitrator has
authority to resolve "differences over the meaning or interpreta-
tion of the contract"42-arbitrators invariably imply the power
to award traditional contract damages4" on the theory that the
38. See, e.g., Valley Camp Coal Co., 66 Lab. Arb. 930, 932 (1976)
(although the employer's failure to provide adequate hot water for
showers was "inexcusable" because the employer's response to a "ple-
thora of complaints over a continuing period of time" had been only an
"inadequate" attempt to fix the showers, the arbitrator could find "no
basis upon which an award for monetary damages can be based" since
the affected employees "suffered no loss in wages as a result of the lack
of hot water"); Consolidation Coal Co., 65 Lab. Arb. 1167, 1174-76 (1975)
(where employer failure to comply with contractual safety requirements
caused employees to refuse to work, an award of wages "for time not
worked ... would constitute an award in the form of punitive dam-
ages," a form of relief "not provided for, either by law, or contract" and
thus "not within the arbitrator's authority"); Pittsburgh Steel Co., 42
Lab. Arb. 1002, 1008 (1964) (no effective remedy available because em-
ployees failed to establish "real injury" stemming from employer manip-
ulation of vacation schedules and because arbitrator may not award
"punitive damages"); Walker Mfg. Co., 42 Lab Arb. 632, 637 (1964)
(loss caused by failure of company to grant union official leave of
absence to permit him to participate in organizing a campaign was
"highly speculative" and not compensable); Green River Steel Corp.,
41 Lab. Arb. 132, 136 (1963) (impossible for arbitrator to award com-
pensation "except by way of penalty" for failure of employer to notify
union of contracting-out of work); Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 37 Lab. Arb.
134, 136 (1961) (arbitrator should not remedy nonmonetary losses such
as inconvenience by awards designed as punitive damages).
39. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
40. [A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and applica-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course
look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960).
41. Fleming, supra note 13, at 1212; Stutz, Arbitrators and the Rem-
edy Power, in NATIONAL ACADEmY OF ARBITRATORS, LABOR ARBITRAION
AND INDUsTRIAL CHANGE 54, 60 (M. Kahn ed. 1963).
42. Fleming, supra note 13, at 1212.
43. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HAxv. L. REv. 1482,
1494 (1959). See Pittsburgh Steel Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 1002, 1008 (1964);
Walker Mfg. Co., 42 Lab. Ab. 632, 637 (1964).
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parties do not intend arbitration as an "academic exercise."44
They refuse, however, to imply contractual power to award
penalties. 45
Collective bargaining agreements do not compel such a
restrictive interpretation.46 Although express provisions pro-
scribing "penalty" awards must, of course, control, most collec-
tive bargaining agreements contain no language directly addres-
sing the "penalty" issue. Consequently, other factors must be
considered. Significantly, the Supreme Court has indicated that
national labor policy may appropriately influence the interpreta-
tion of the agreement.47 This policy, aimed at reducing indus-
44. [A]rbitrators have quite uniformly held that the parties
were not engaged in an academic exercise in seeking a ruling
as to whether the contract had been violated, and that the power
to decide the contract violation must therefore carry with it the
power to award a remedy.
Fleming, supra note 13, at 1212.
45. See Sunstrand Corp., 47 Lab. Arb. 284, 286 (1966); Walker
Mfg. Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 632, 637 (1964); Green River Steel Corp., 41 Lab.
Arb. 132, 137 (1963); Wolff, supra note 9, at 187. Cf. International Oper-
ating Eng'rs, Local 450 v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (1972).
46. Cf. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 50 Lab. Arb. 933, 938 (1968):
[T]he Company asserts there is nothing in the Agreement that
authorizes the Arbitrator to award damages absent a showing
of monetary loss. This argument is not convincing. It is
equally true that there is nothing in the collective agreement
authorizing the Arbitrator to award damages where there is a
showing of monetary loss, yet the Company concedes the Arbi-
trator's power to do so. The Agreement simply does not deal
with the question of the circumstances under which damages are
to be awarded or the principles on which they are to be com-
puted. This is a matter as to which the parties have given the
Arbitrator no explicit guidance, but rather have left him with
the task of ascertaining their implicit intent. Hence the absence
of language in the Agreement explicitly authorizing the Arbitra-
tor to award damages absent a showing of monetary loss is not
fatal to his power to do so.
In Sheetmetal Workers, Local 416 v. Helgesteel Corp., 335 F. Supp.
812 (W.D. Wis. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 507 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir.
1974), the court denied a motion for summary judgment which urged
that the arbitrator's award be struck down as "punitive." In doing so,
the court seemed willing to assume that the award was punitive and
without compensatory basis:
The general rule with respect to the award of an arbitrator or
arbitration board is that so long as the award draws its essence
from the collective agreement, it is immune from attack....
Since the labor agreement at issue contains no specific provisions
on the subject of remedies, the arbitrator was free to exercise
its discretion. Thus, the question here is not whether the award
was "punitive" but rather whether it was reasonable in light of
the findings of the arbitration board.
335 F. Supp. at 816.
47. In the clearest example of this, United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960), the Court established
a strong presumption in favor of the arbitrability of labor contract dis-
putes because of the public policy favoring arbitration:
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trial tension, requires that some remedy be fashioned to protect
all interests encompassed by the agreement, even though not com-
pensable under standard contract doctrine.48 The very fact that
particular interests are encompassed by the collective bargaining
agreement indicates that the parties intended them to be re-
spected, necessitating an appropriate remedy when those inter-
ests are injured.49 The converse suggests that the parties
intended to sanction disregard of the contract.50
[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be re-
quired to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not
agreed so to submit. Yet, to be consistent with congressional
policy in favor of settlement of disputes by the parties through
the machinery of arbitration, the judicial inquiry . . . must be
strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did
agree to arbitrate the grievance or did agree to give the arbitra-
tor power to make the award he made. An order to arbitrate
the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be
said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.
Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
With regard to arbitral remedies, several lower court decisions subse-
quent to Enterprise Wheel have indorsed a public policy presumption
similar to that established for determining arbitrability: only positive
contractual declarations of exclusion should restrict arbitral remedial
power. Lodge No. 12, Dist. No. 37, IAM v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc.,
292 F.2d 112, 119 (5th Cir. 1961). See United Steelworkers v. United
States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
998 (1974); International Union of Dist. 50, UMW v. Bowman Transp.,
Inc., 421 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1970).
48. The fact that collective bargaining agreements are markedly in-
complete legitimates, according to Professor Summers,
the exercise by arbitrators and courts, of a creative -function in
completing the agreement. It invites inquiry beyond the often
futile or artificial search for nonexistent intent and encourages
explicit consideration of such factors as the purposes of the
parties and the institutional needs of collective bargaining, jus-
tice and fairness between the parties, the interests of third
parties, and the public interest.
Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J.
525, 551-52 (1969).
49. When a particular situation calls for a certain remedy, it
is not at all clear to me that the parties can be said to have
a reasonable expectation that the arbitrator will not utilize that
remedy, however novel. To the contrary, absent contract lan-guage directed to the question of remedies for a breach of
contract, I would think that the reasonable expectation of the
parties would be that the arbitrator would order a remedy
appropriate to the case. Normally this can be expected to be a
familiar remedy, but where the familiar remedies are inade-
quate the arbitrator (or at least some arbitrators) can surelybe expected to acquiesce in a more satisfactory remedy requested
by one of the parties.
Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 50 Lab. Arb. 933, 939 (1968).
50. Some arbitrators contend that the clause found in many collec-
tive agreements cautioning arbitrators not to "add to, alter, or supple-
ment" the language of the contract, Fleming, supra note 13, at 1212, pro-
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The refusal to award arbitral "penalties" is doubtless rooted
primarily in a reluctance to grant punitive damages in breach
of contract actions5 ' rather than solely in a desire to fulfill the
intention of the parties. The policies underlying these contract
law doctrines, however, are inapplicable in the context of collec-
tive bargaining agreements, and thus should not restrain the
remedial flexibility of labor arbitration.52  Two considerations
hibits the award of arbitral penalties. Sirefman, supra note 13, at 32.
See, e.g., Green River Steel Corp., 41 Lab. Arb. 132, 137 (1963). This
contention seems to rest on the assumption that the penalty proscription,
by implication, is a part of the contract which, by virtue of the "no alter-
ations clause," may not be overridden, rather than that the "no altera-
tions clause" in and of itself constitutes such a restriction. It therefore
assumes the conclusion here at issue-that the contract contains an im-
plied restriction on arbitral penalty power.
51. Fleming, supra note 13, at 1215; Sirefman, supra note 13, at 30-
31; Wolff, supra note 9, at 187. See International Operating Eng'rs, Local
450 v. Mid-Valley, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Walker
Mfg. Co., 42 Lab. Arb. 632, 637 (1964); Phillip Carey Mfg. Co., 37 Lab.
Arb. 134, 135 (1961).
52. The policy against punitive damages was relied on by a court
hearing a labor contract dispute without the benefit of an arbitral award
(due to absence of an applicable arbitration clause) in Local 127, United
Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 298 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962). A
split court in Brooks Shoe Mfg. struck down a district court award of
punitive damages in a breach of contract action brought under section
301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(a) (1970), which authorizes suits for breach of labor contracts to be
brought in federal court. Among the reasons for the reversal, the court
cited the award's tension with the "remedial nature" of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, see Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7(1940) (denying penalty power to the NLRB), from which the courts
draw their remedial power under section 301, Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). This rationale, however, is inapplicable to
the arbitration of disputes since arbitrators draw their remedial power
from the collective bargaining agreement, see note 40 supra, rather than
from any statute.
Moreover, several subsequent decisions have suggested, as did a dis-
senter on the punitive damages issue in Brooks Shoe, that penalties
are not inherently antithetical to the collective bargaining relation-
ship and that the cause of industrial stability may on occasion justify
punitive awards. See Crawford v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 386
F. Supp. 290 (D. Wyo. 1974) ("the claim against the employer for puni-
tive damages cannot stand, absent extraordinary circumstances." 386 F.
Supp. at 295 (emphasis supplied)); Butler v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 747, 754 (W.D. Mo. 1974), modified, 514 F.2d 442 (8th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Zamora v. Massey-Ferguson,
336 F. Supp. 588, 591 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Patrick v. I.D. Packing Co., 308
F. Supp. 821, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1969); Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk-
drivers Union, Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Ill. 1966). A recent
Second Circuit decision called into question the Brooks rationale, and
implied that under certain circumstances punitive damage awards might
be recognized in the future. In Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285
(2d Cir. 1975), the court stated:
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are normally thought to justify the judicial refusal to grant puni-
tive damages. First, substituted monetary performance, repre-
sented by compensatory damages, normally constitutes an "ade-
quate" remedy. 53 Courts award punitive damages in response
to "outrageous" torts-such as spitting in a person's face 4-
which arouse individual and community wrath.55 The award
peacefully satiates the desire for revenge, thus stemming resort
to private, violent means of vengeance. Breaches of contract do
not typically threaten such societal disorder.5 6 Second, the possi-
bility of punitive damages would create uncertainty repugnant to
commercial transactions. 57 Uncertainty hinders a party's deter-
mination of whether or not it would be "profitable" to breach
the contract-that is, whether a gain made possible by the breach
will exceed its cost. Because a "profitable" breach benefits
society by more efficiently allocating resources, 58 the law gen-
erally encourages such breach. The unpredictability of jury
awards also contributes to the fear of uncertainty.5 9
These considerations suggest the contrary result when
applied to labor contract altercations. The first consideration
assumes that remedies "adequate" in a commercial context can
meet the demands of collective bargaining agreement disputes.
On the contrary, the social disorder threatened by breach of a
collective bargaining agreement is of much greater magnitude
than in most breaches of contract. Labor contract breaches
threaten "industrial warfare"--with all the calamitous conse-
quences prompting national labor policy.60 Further, disputes
[A]lthough the remedies available to vindicate Holodnak's right
are not entirely defined by the Act itself, it is at least true that
any judicial enforcement of that right must "look ... at the
policy of the legislation and fashion a remedy that will effectu-
ate that policy." [citing Lincoln Mills] . . . [W]here there had
been an explicit finding that punitive damages are unnecessary
to deter any future contravention, we are of the view that a
greater exaction from Avco would not further any policy em-
bodied in the Act.
514 F.2d at 291 (emphasis supplied).
53. Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIO ST.
L.J. 284 (1959).
54. See Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553, 554 (1872).
55. 6 A. Conixn, CONTRACTS § 1077, at 438 (1966); cf. Morris, Puni-
tive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1198-99 (1931).
56. 6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 55.
57. Simpson, supra note 53, at 284.
58. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REAIEDiEs 795 (1973).
59. Simpson, supra note 53, at 284.
60. While the type of industrial warfare that the national policy
is aimed at avoiding is generally assumed to encompass such major dis-
putes as strikes and lockouts, see, e.g., H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE
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over labor contracts arise more frequently than do disputes in
a commercial context.61 The danger of strife is enhanced by
the fact that many of the interests reflected in the collective bar-
gaining agreement do not find vindication in the current arsenal
of arbitral remedies.
As to the second consideration, "penalty" awards would
make the consequences of labor contract breaches more uncer-
tain. It is far from clear, however, that the breaching activity
thus inhibited would be "profitable" in terms of benefit to
society. The losses caused by industrial strife constitute a factor,
not present in the commercial setting, which could more than
offset any gains achieved through more efficient resource alloca-
tion. Given the likelihood of industrial tension in those situa-
tions where injury to intangible interests supposedly protected
by the collective bargaining agreement is ignored, it is doubtful
that society benefits by application of the punitive damages pro-
scription. Indeed, the converse can be argued: punitive dam-
ages, by discouraging breach and reducing the level of industrial
confrontation, promote a more efficient economy. Fear of jury
capriciousness, of course, is irrelevant in the arbitral setting.62
LEGAL PROCESS 117-18 (1968), at least one scholar argues that a careful
reading of The Steelworkers Trilogy compels the conclusion that the
policy is also aimed at minor irritations and tensions which may affect
industrial productivity. See Rubenstein, Some Thoughts on Labor Arbi-
tration, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 695, 701 (1966). This view is supported by the
Senate committee report on the Wagner Bill (which became the National
Labor Relations Act), which cited inefficiency as one of the evils caused
by industrial tension. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1935).
61. Although labor contracts are complex, the bargaining process
often requires that many matters remain unresolved. The collective bar-
gaining agreement is thus "only the gateway to resolution of remaining
disagreements." Summers, supra note 48, at 529. The nature of the
union-management relationship governed by collective bargaining agree-
ments also contributes to the likelihood of dispute. The relationship, due
to federal labor legislation, is a compelled and continuing one. Id. at
530-34. Conversely, in most commercial relationships, a party has the
option of "taking his business elsewhere" if he is unhappy with past con-
tractual performance. This "pressure valve" will often act to deter con-
duct by one party that generates dissatisfaction in the other.
Businessmen who insisted on litigating such matters with cus-
tomers or suppliers would soon have few of either, but the com-
pulsory quality of the collective bargaining relation binds the
parties together regardless of their litigiousness. In many col-
lective bargaining relationships the loss of good will is counted
of little consequence and resort to arbitration is considered the
normal and acceptable way of conducting affairs.
Summers, supra note 48, at 536. See also Rubenstein, supra note 61, at
704.
62. The lack of contractual standards guiding and restricting the
amount awarded as a penalty disturbed the court in the Publishers' Ass'n
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Even in the mainstream of contract decisions, courts recog-
nize that the punitive damage prohibition extends only so far
as the policies underlying it.63 Thus, where there is a heightened
public interest in the contractual relationship, courts have found
punitive damages appropriate. For example, in Brown v.
Coates,64 then Chief Judge Burger, in considering a breach of
fiduciary obligations created by a real estate brokerage agree-
ment, stated:
When one is commissioned by, or holds himself out to, the
community to perform special services which may be engaged
for hire by others in the conduct of their personal or business
affairs . . .such persons assume certain fiduciary relationships.
The community in turn has a broad public interest, as a matter
of public policy, in how such persons conduct their relations
with those who place trust in them. In this case we express the
broad public policy by the imposition of punitive damages. 65
While the type of contract in Coates may differ in many respects
from collective bargaining agreements, the element of heightened
case, discussed at note 13 supra. Any fears of a "runaway award" by
an arbitrator, however, seem unfounded. In fact, an arbitrator's desire
to be hired in subsequent arbitral proceedings may pressure him to seek
to maintain the good will of both parties. Hays, The Future of Labor
Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019, 1035 (1965). Such pressure tends to cause
"baby-splitting"-awards which may slight the merits of the dispute in
an attempt to placate both the employer and the union.
63. It is sometimes said that breach of contract will not be a
basis for punitive awards, and indeed this is often the case. But
it is an over-generalization to say contract breach never justifies
punitive awards. The test in all these cases is not the plaintiff's
theory, or the "form of action," but the nature of the defendant's
state of mind and the nature of his conduct.
DOBBS, supra note 58, at 207. See also Note, The Expanding Availability
of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Note, IND. L. REv.].
64. 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
65. 253 F.2d at 40. While the tort of deceit was alleged in Brown,
the court found it unnecessary to reach that issue in order to uphold
the punitive damage award. 253 F.2d at 40-41. Increased public interest
sufficient to support punitive damage awards is typically found where
a contract is breached by one in a position of "privilege or power." 6
A. CoRBIN, supra note 55, at 443-44; DOBBS, supra note 58, at 206. Thus
the public interest in deterrence and punishment is recognized where
there is bad faith breach of contractual obligations by public utilities,
6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 55, at 443; DOBBS, supra note 58, at 206; banks
(as to obligations owed their depositors), 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 55,
at 444; see Patterson v. Marine Nat'l Bank, 130 Pa. 419, 18 A. 632 (1889);
insurance companies, Note, IND. L. REv., supra note 63, at 678-79; DOBBS,
supra note 58, at 206; see Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 376, 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (1970); or fiduciaries, see Brown
v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The public interest in these rela-
tionships seems to be that of "potential victim" of the oppressive prac-
tices represented by the breach. Cf. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., supra at 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95:
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public interest is evident in both.68 This suggests an analogous
exception to the punitive damages limitation in the instance of
labor contracts."
lII.
It has already been shown that injuries to intangible inter-
ests warrant protection-protection denied under the "penalty"
proscription.68 The Cotton Baking and Mallinckrodt decisions
are commendable for recognizing both the significance of intan-
gible interests and the need for their protection. Neither deci-
sion, however, satisfactorily articulates a legal theory which
might be utilized by labor arbitrators in determining the occa-
sions appropriate for remedial action.
The development of such a theory initially requires recogni-
tion of the twin objectives underlying awards given for breaches
of collective bargaining agreements. One goal is to compensate
[T]he special obligations of public utilities and other enterprises
affected with the public interest has been noted as significant
in the imposition of liability upon such defendants even in the
absence of outrageous conduct, apparently on a policy basis of
encouraging fair treatment of the public whom the enterprises
serve.
66. The public is clearly a potential victim of the economic disrup-
tion caused by industrial warfare, see note 2 supra and accompanying.
text.
67. Cf. Sidney Wanzer & Sons, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union, Local
753, 249 F. Supp. 664, 671 n.5: "The § 301 suit is distinguishable from
the ordinary suit for breach of contract. Strong considerations of public
policy, emphasized in Lincoln Mills, suggest that the usual rule barring
exemplary damages in a breach of contract suit need not apply."
The public interest in labor relations justified an award of punitive
damages in Fittipaldi v. Lagassies, 18 App. Div. 2d 331, 239 N.Y.S.2d 792
(4th Dep't 1963), where a union violated the rights of a member that
were guaranteed by the union charter. Such rights are contractual in
nature, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618-
19 (1959). The court in Fittipaldi first noted that fraud "aimed at the
public generally" justifies a punitive damage award. The court con-
tinued:
Strong reasons of policy promote the use of exemplary damages
to deter union officials from conduct designed to suppress the
rights of members to a fair and democratic hearing on legitimate
disciplinary charges. The very basis for the existence of union-
ism in our society today is the promise of employment to those
who desire to associate freely in order to obtain it. The right
of the working man to the benefits of collective bargaining is
too essential and valuable to be hindered....
18 App. Div. 2d at 334, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 796. While the finding of public
interest in this case might be said to derive specifically from the regula-
tion of union affairs contained in the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. §
411 (1957), the Act was not mentioned by the court.
68. See notes 34-67 supra and accompanying text.
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the injured party by putting him in the same monetary position
he would have occupied had the breach not occurred. A second
objective is to maintain industrial peace.6 9 An arbitral award
serves this latter goal in two fashions. First, since any award
made in response to a particular action has the effect of deter-
ring future occurrence of that action, it promotes industrial peace
by lessening the likelihood of future breaches.7 0 Second, an
award ensures psychological tranquility by protecting the par-
ties' justified expectations arising under the collective bargaining
agreement. Unless the parties perceive the terms of the em-
ployment relationship being respected and their positions as
equal bargaining powers being maintained, frustration is likely
to result, leading to conduct inconsistent with the national goal
of a stable and productive economy.
71
69. The parties expect that [the arbitrator's] judgment of a
particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract says
but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such
factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its
consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether
tensions will be heightened or diminished.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960).
70. In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Or-
ganization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975), the Court noted the deterrent effect of
an arbitral award for breach of an anti-discrimination clause in the col-
lective bargaining agreement:
Nor is there any reason to believe that the processing of griev-
ances is inherently limited to the correction of individual cases
of discrimination. Quite apart from the essentially contractual
question of whether the Union could grieve against a "pattern
or practice" it deems inconsistent with the non-discrimination
clause of the contract, one would hardly expect an employer to
continue in effect an employment practice that routinely results
in adverse arbitral decisions.
420 U.S. at 66-67.
71. The Supreme Court emphasized the threat to industrial peace
posed by employees' perceptions that an employer's wrongful conduct
has gone unremedied in Golden State Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 414
U.S. 168 (1973). In holding employers liable for the unfair labor prac-
tices of their predecessors, the Court stated:
When a new employer... has acquired substantial assets of its
predecessor and continued, without interruption or substantial
change, the predecessor's business operations, those employees
who have been retained will understandably view their job situ-
ations as essentially unaltered. Under these circumstances, the
employees may well perceive the successor's failure to remedy
the predecessor employer's unfair labor practices arising out of
an unlawful discharge as a continuation of the predecessor's
labor policies. To the extent that the employees' legitimate ex-
pectation is that the unfair labor practices will be remedied, a
successor's failure to do so may result in labor unrest as the em-
ployees engage in collective activity to force remedial action.
414 U.S. at 184.
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Where breach of the collective bargaining agreement causes
tangible injury, traditional compensatory damage theory satisfac-
torily serves these objectives. By definition, the injured party
is made whole, recovering for any related monetary loss which
can be calculated with reasonable certainty. Future occurrences
of tension-generating breaches are made less likely through the
deterrent effect of the award. Finally, the injured party is
psychologically appeased, for he observes the legal system pro-
tecting his bargained-for rights and vindicating his position over
that of the breaching party.
Where a breach of the collective bargaining agreement causes
both tangible and intangible injuries, traditional compensatory
damage theory only partially serves the compensation objective,
since injured parties receive no distinct award for the intangible
loss. The industrial peace objective, however, is achieved by an
award which compensates only the tangible injury. The award
will deter similar breaches in the future,72 and the injured
parties receive the satisfaction of knowing that the breaching
party has paid for his misconduct. In this situation, therefore, the
72. The suggestion that compensatory awards deter future breach
should be taken in the form of a rebuttable presumption. The facts of
United Elec. Workers, Local 1114 v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221 (7th
Cir. 1975), suggests a situation where an award over and above compen-
satory amounts might be necessary in order to accomplish deterrence.
In Honeywell, the union sought an injunction against the employer's
repeated violation of a sub-contracting clause. The union had previously
recovered four separate compensatory awards against the employer.
Not only were the employer's continuing violations threatening the
union's reputation, Brief for Appellant at 10, United Elec. Workers,
Local 1114 v. Honeywell, Inc., supra, but arbitration costs were also
depleting union resources, id. at 9. The court, nevertheless, denied an
injunction. Under the facts alleged by the union, a penalty award by
the arbitrator would have better protected the union's contractual
expectations.
The problem of arbitration costs, raised by the Honeywell case, is
of particular interest. Insofar as the injured party goes uncompensated
for these costs, he remains in a position inferior to that enjoyed prior
to breach. This imperfection in the compensation system opens the door
to abuses, the prevention of which may necessitate a "penalty." Where
an employer is of vastly superior economic strength compared to the
union, it may choose to bear its portion of the arbitration costs as well
as small compensatory awards as part of an economic war of attrition.
Cf. Fleming, supra note 13, at 1216-17. The use of penalty awards to
prevent such tactics is consistent with traditional uses of punitive dam-
ages to reimburse attorneys' fees. See DOBBS, supra note 58, at 221; W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK or THE LAW or ToRTS 11 (4th ed. 1971).
Courts have recently shown a willingness to strengthen the integrity
of arbitral awards by compelling the losing party to pay the opponent's
attorneys' fees whenever "unjustified" refusal to comply with an arbitral
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use of traditional compensatory damage theory is still accept-
able.73
Where only intangible interests are harmed, however,
compensatory damage theory is inadequate, for the "certainty of
proof of damages" requirement of that theory cannot be met.
Nevertheless, in light of the aforementioned purposes behind
arbitral awards, the need for an award is equally great. The
fact of the injury remains, and some award must be made. As
stated in Mallinckrodt:
decision necessitates a court enforcement action. See note 33 supra. This
has led some to speculate that an arbitrator has similar power with re-
gard to arbitration costs. Fleming, supra note 13, at 1217. Cf. Wolff,
supra note 9, at 191. Because it is restricted to expenses actually in-
curred, such an award is arguably "compensatory" rather than a penalty.
See Litton Syss., Inc. v. Shopmen's Local 552, 90 L.R.RM. 3176 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (court upholds arbitrator's award "compensating" employer
for arbitration costs and attorneys' fees where union made "persistent
attempts to frustrate the arbitration" by pursuing a course of "willful
delay"). Cf. United Steelworkers v. Butler Mfg. Co., 439 F.2d 1110 (8th
Cir. 1971). As the Supreme Court has recently noted, however, "the
underlying rationale of 'fee-shifting' is, of course, punitive" since the
"essential element in triggering the award of fees is . . . the existence
of 'bad faith' on the part of the unsuccessful litigant." Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Moreover, direct compensation of arbitration costs
would seem to be precluded by an express contractual allocation of
those costs. See Oscar Joseph Stores, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 569 (1963).
But see Fleming, supra note 13, at 1217; Litton Syss., Inc. v. Shopmen's
Local 552, supra at 3180 app. A. Where such an allocation is made, an
award aimed at deterring the breach, rather than compensating arbitra-
tion costs, is called for.
73. By failing to distinguish such a situation, the Cotton Baking ra-
tionale, see text accompanying notes 18-19 supra, while achieving a
proper result on the facts of the case, goes too far. The unrefined com-
pensatory theory adopted by the Cotton Baking court would seem to re-
quire an arbitrator, whenever he identifies an injury to an intangible in-
terest, to make an award to recompense that interest. Thus even if a
tangible injury caused by the breach were compensated, logical consist-
ency would require that an additional award be made specifically for
any intangible injuries. Any layoff of employees (due to sub-contract-
ing) violative of the agreement, for example, injures the job security of
those remaining on the job in the same fashion as in Cotton Baking,
where the employer failed to hire additional bargaining unit workers.
In both cases, there are fewer jobs to "bump down" to than if the con-
tract had been obeyed. Yet in the former situation, since back-pay
awards will be made to improperly laid-off employees, even courts and
arbitrators willing to protect intangible interests will hesitate to also
compensate the injury to job security. See Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 37
Lab. Arb. 134, 136 (1961). Absent the egregious consequence of allow-
ing a party to breach the contract and cause intangible injuries without
inhibition, as threatened in factual situations similar to Cotton Baking,
the policies disfavoring the compensation of intangible injuries because
of lack of reasonably certain proof are persuasive.
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Where the employer's wrongful act of assigning work in
breach of contract may have led to an injury, and the facts are
such that neither the union nor the employer can conclusively
prove that such an injury will or will not occur, who should
suffer from the difficulty of proof? Should it be the wholly
innocent employees or the employer whose breach of contract
(knowing in the instant case) has created the possibility of in-
jury? Surely a strong argument can be made that under these
circumstances, it is the wrongdoer who ought to suffer the con-
sequences of uncertainty.7 4
Similarly, as recognized by the Cotton Baking court, an arbitral
award will have the effect of bringing "the parties' actions into
conformity with the contract."75 This is clearly desirable, for
a damage award for a knowing breach of contract will encourage
a good faith effort to abide by the contract-the very least that
ought be required of, and indeed may be said to be implicitly
agreed to by, both parties to a collective bargaining agreement.7 6
Finally, the parties' faith in the collective bargaining and arbi-
tral processes will be maintained by such an award. The
arbitrator will not appear impotent in the face of contract viola-
tions, and the parties will not be tempted to employ disruptive
devices to attain their ends.
77
74. 50 Lab. Arb. 933, 937 (1968). See Five Star Hardware & Elec.
Corp., 44 Lab. Arb. 944, 946-47 (1965). The argument that the breach-
ing party should bear the burden of uncertainty of injury is found on
occasion in the commercial setting. See, e.g., Locke v. United States,
283 F.2d 521 (Ct. Cl. 1960). Moreover, leniency in proof requirements
also characterizes the award of compensatory damages for such in-
tangible injuries as patent and copyright infringement, interference with
contracts, and commercial disparagement. DOBBS, supra note 58, at 432.
75. 514 F.2d at 1237.
76. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 50 Lab. Arb. 933, 936 (1968).
77. An alternative to any damage award in such a situation might
be for the arbitrator to issue a cease and desist order. Cf. United Elec.
Workers, Local 1114 v. Honeywell, Inc., 522 F.2d 1221, discussed at
note 73 supra. This alternative was considered and rejected by the arbi-
trator in Mallinckrodt:
I reject.., the argument that the only appropriate award which
an arbitrator may provide for knowing or repeated breaches...
is an order directing the offending party to cease and desist from
the breach involved. An arbitral cease and desist order is mean-
ingless absent judicial enforcement. Once judicial enforcement
is obtained, however, future questions as to whether there has
been a breach of the relevant contract provisions are apt to be
framed in terms of whether or not a contempt of the court's
order has occurred and litigated before the court on that ground.
... It is my opinion that a basic purpose of arbitration is to
avoid resort to courts as well as strikes and I am disinclined
to include in awards any provisions which might encourage fur-
ther litigation.
50 Lab. Arb. 933, 940 (1968). This argument is buttressed by the impor-
tance which the speed of the arbitral process has in justifying the policy
of arbitral deference. See note 9 supra.
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Simply because a party suffers intangible injury unaccom-
panied by a tangible injury, however, does not necessarily mean
that a monetary award will contribute to industrial peace. This
contribution is assured only if two additional factors are present.
First, an award should be made only if the breaching party
should have anticipated that his conduct would result in arbitra-
tion. This "knowing-conduct" requirement serves two functions.
First, breach can only be avoided when a party has reason to
think that his conduct may violate the contract. A course of
conduct reasonably pursued without foresight as to its conse-
quences cannot be deterred. By the same token, many breaches
and consequent injuries might be avoided if questionable courses
of action were arbitrated before they were taken, rather than
afterwards. Each party would be encouraged by these monetary
awards to make a reasonable effort to anticipate disputes and
avoid unnecessary injury. Second, the presence of "knowing con-
duct" makes the breach appear more egregious, and thus more
likely to arouse anger, resentment, and consequent industrial
strife. Drawing the "knowing conduct" line will be fraught with
difficulty, but it is the type of judgment that an arbitrator's
expertise qualifies him to make.
The second factor which must be present in order to assure
that a monetary award will contribute to industrial peace is that
the injury in question be "substantial." Where the injury suf-
fered as a result of contractual breach is trivial, arbitrators
should refuse to reward the litigiousness of the grievant. To do
otherwise is to encourage labor-management confrontation by
inciting the parties to challenge even inconsequential breaches
in the hope of receiving a "penalty"-a result incompatible with
the objective of easing industrial tension. Arbitrators have long
recognized the soundness of requiring that monetary awards be
predicated on "substantial" injuries by following the principle
of de minimis non curat lex to deny relief where the contractual
interests concerned are "trifling. 'T 8 Arbitrators applying this
doctrine, however, -must avoid distinguishing significant from
insignificant injuries on the basis of the compensatory "provable
monetary loss" standard. As suggested throughout this Note,
whether or not an injury is "tangible," and thus susceptible to
monetary quantification, has little bearing on whether or not the
injury may provoke industrial turmoil.7 9 Thus the application
78. Sirefrnan, spra note 13, at 17-18.
79. Cf. ACF Industries, Inc., 62 Lab. Arb. 364, 367 (1974) (arbitrator
expresses sympathy with the argument that where principle is large, an
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of the de minimis principle according to a "provable monetary
loss" standard would open a gap in arbitral remedies identical
to that created by the "penalty proscription": intangible, but
tension-generating breaches would go unremedied. Instead of
scrutinizing only the "provable monetary loss" caused by a
breach, arbitrators should focus directly on the threat to indus-
trial peace posed by the breach. Arbitrators should include in
their assessment of an injury's substantiality the number of
people affected by the breach, the extensiveness of the breaching
activity, and the impact of the breach on the "psychological tran-
quility" of the parties. Applied in this manner, the de minimis
principle will insure that monetary awards in response to
intangible injuries support rather than thwart the goal of
industrial peace.
IV.
Attaining the national goal of industrial stability requires
the peaceful administration of collective bargaining agreements.
To this end, the Supreme Court has established private arbitra:
tion as the preferred means of protecting the expectations raised
by labor contracts, emphasizing the importance of arbitral reme-
dial flexibility in resolving disputes. Where the parties concur
with this preference by including a broad arbitration clause in
their agreement, they must anticipate that the arbitrator will
order whatever remedy is appropriate to the case. The protection
of substantial intangible interests affected by the collective bar-
gaining agreement, necessary to industrial peace, requires a diver-
gence from the traditional compensatory remedies associated
with commercial contracts. Monetary awards must be made
where a knowing breach of contract injures intangible interests,
despite the difficulty in calculating such an award, in order to
encourage obedience to the contract and maintain injured parties'
faith in the collective bargaining agreement s0 Peaceful admin-
award may be justified even though the amount is small); Sirefman,
supra note 13, at 22:
Contracting-out can often be a source of friction between
union and company. The latter feels that its very existence de-
mands the cutting of costs wherever possible, while the former
feels that the integrity of the bargaining unit will be under-
mined.... The possibility of eroding the bargaining unit tran-
scends the relatively insignificant loss in terms of numbers and
money.
80. Awards for injury to job security may become crucial in con-
junction with developing remedies under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination. The Supreme
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istration of collective bargaining agreements demands no less.
Court has ruled that victims of illegally discriminatory employment
practices may be awarded "back seniority." Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1251 (1976). Such a remedy is unsatisfactory, since
the person at whose cost the remedy is extracted is a fellow employee
(whose comparative seniority status suffers because of the award),
rather than the employer who committed the discrimination. Such
"punishment" of innocent employees is counterproductive in terms
of facilitating better race (or sex) relations, and may engender sufficient
animosity to threaten industrial peace. Cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Inc., id. at 1272 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Rather than controvert-
ing these dangers, the Franks majority merely seemed to suggest they
are part of the price to be paid in the battle against discrimination.
An employee whose seniority rights are denigrated by an award of back
seniority to another, however, may not be remediless.
In his Franks dissent, Chief Justice Burger noted the possibility that
employees injured by a back seniority award might petition a court for
equitable relief. Id. Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrim-
ination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1976). In addition, the
injured employee might command a remedy in damages because the
employer has indirectly breached the seniority provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Another ground for a claim of employer
breach might be based on the "anti-discrimination clause" contained in
many collective bargaining agreements. A penalty award in such a case
would serve the laudatory goals of easing tensions between employees
who receive back seniority awards and those at whose expense the
awards are made, as well as shifting the burden of such a remedy to the
employer, thus accomplishing the primary goal of Title VII remedies:
encouraging employer compliance. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Further
it would do so without compromising the Title VII goal-making victims
of illegal discrimination "whole"-found overriding in Franks.
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